The need for data encryption that protects sensitive data in a database has increased rapidly. However, encrypted data can no longer be efficiently queried because nearly all of the data should be decrypted. Several order-preserving encryption schemes that enable indexes to be built over encrypted data have been suggested to solve this problem. They allow any comparison operation to be directly applied to encrypted data. However, one of the main disadvantages of these schemes is that they expose sensitive data to inference attacks with order information, especially when the data are used together with unencrypted columns in the database. In this study, a new order-preserving encryption scheme that provides secure queries by hiding the order is introduced. Moreover, it provides efficient queries because any user who has the encryption key knows the order. The proposed scheme is designed to be efficient and secure in such an environment. Thus, it is possible to encrypt only sensitive data while leaving other data unencrypted. The encryption is not only robust against order exposure, but also shows high performance for any query over encrypted data. In addition, the proposed scheme provides strong updates without assumptions of the distribution of plaintext. This allows it to be integrated easily with the existing database system.
causes undesirable performance degradation, as the algorithms do not preserve the order. Consequently, the database indexes can no longer be used. As almost all encrypted data must be decrypted, queries over encrypted database can become prohibitively slow.
Database-specific encryption schemes that perform well for queries over encrypted database are very advantageous. In general, several order-preserving encryption schemes [2] - [4] have been shown to provide the advantage of an efficient search over encrypted data. Such schemes support a direct comparison of ciphertexts, which allows the building of indexes that support equality and range queries as well as MAX, MIN, and COUNT queries without decrypting the ciphertexts. However, order-preserving encryption schemes are not secure against inference attacks if an adversary can guess the domain and knows the distribution of values in that domain [5] . First, one important security problem associated with these schemes is that they expose sensitive data to inference attacks with order information, especially when the data are used together with unencrypted columns in the database.
In reality, it is more practical to encrypt only the sensitive columns of a database while leaving other columns unencrypted for efficiency concerns. However, an orderpreserving encryption scheme such as OPES (Order Preserving Encryption Scheme) as proposed by Agrawal et al. [4] , is insecure in such an environment. Although an adversary does not obtain any information about plaintext directly from the order of the encrypted data, the adversary may obtain information concerning encrypted data from unencrypted columns corresponding to the order-preserving encrypted data. Moreover, because it is assumed that the initial distribution of the database does not change, the output values may be highly sensitive to the input distribution if the distribution changes.
This study proposes an encryption scheme called COPE (Chaotic Order Preserving Encryption), which is more efficient and secure than other order-preserving encryption schemes. In COPE, the plaintexts order is essentially hidden but can be identified by the database system. In addition, the proposed scheme provides strong updates without assumptions of the input distribution, allowing it to be integrated easily with existing database systems. This paper is organized as follows: Related work is discussed in Sect. 2. The security model is presented and an overview of COPE is given in Sect. 3 . The next two sections describe in greater detail the two main phases of COPE. In Sect. 6, both the efficiency and the security of the proposed scheme are evaluated. The study concludes in Sect. 7 with a summary and plans for future research.
Related Work
Database-specific encryption techniques known as orderpreserving encryption algorithms have recently been the subject of a number of investigations. They perform very efficiently while guaranteeing a certain degree of security under limited circumstances. The techniques allow the construction of indexes and apply equality and range queries as well as MAX, MIN, and COUNT queries directly without the need for a decryption process. A simple scheme, as initially introduced to the field of order-preserving encryption, was proposed in [2] . It calculates the sum of random numbers generated by a secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). However, it is highly inefficient, especially for large values, as the calls to the PRNG for summation increase in proportion to the values. Moreover it deals only with integers. In terms of security, it is not secure as it leaks the information of the expected gap between two encrypted values from the gap between the corresponding plaintext values.
A scheme using a sequence of strictly increasing polynomial functions was proposed in [3] for order-preserving encryption. It applies linear, quadratic or logarithmic functions repeatedly in such a way that the output of a function becomes the input of the next function. However, as the shape of the distribution of encrypted values depends on the shape of the input distribution, this method may reveal the input distribution, which can be exploited by whoever has access to only the encrypted values. A more serious problem is that this scheme is highly vulnerable to the 'known plaintext attack'. For example, an adversary can easily find the encryption key (coefficients) if he succeeds in obtaining n + 1 pairs of plaintext and ciphertext in the case of an nth degree polynomial function.
The most noticeable scheme among previous orderpreserving encryption methods is OPES, as presented by Agrawal et al. [4] . They considered an application environment in which the goal is safety from an adversary who has access to all encrypted values (the so-called 'ciphertextonly attack' [16] , [17] ). They defined estimation exposure and found that OPES is secure against estimation exposure under the 'ciphertext-only attack'. In OPES, the encrypted values are generated solely from the user-specified target distribution without using any information from the original distribution. Clearly, this scheme does not reveal any information about the original values apart from the order. By appropriately choosing the target distribution, an adversary can be forced to make large estimation errors.
However, to encrypt a given database X, OPES makes use of all the plaintext values currently present in X and assumes that the initial distribution of the database exists and does not change. Therefore, if there is no data (or only a small number of data) in the database, it is not possible to encrypt newly inserted data using OPES, as it cannot make use of the initial distribution of plaintext. Moreover, when a large amount of data are newly inserted, deleted or updated, a change (for example of the parameters or the distribution itself) in the plaintext distribution occurs. In this case, all of the encrypted data should be re-encrypted by OPES. Moreover, as OPES takes the input distribution into account, a given data x i that belongs to a different table is encrypted differently. Thus, it cannot support join queries, which are widely used in the real world, signifying that it is impractical in such environments.
One of the main disadvantages of earlier orderpreserving encryption techniques is that they can disclose sensitive information from the order if used naively. The techniques in some practical circumstances do not sufficiently protect the privacy of the data. It is more practical to encrypt only sensitive columns of a database while leaving other columns unencrypted. Clearly, it is always possible to know the exact order of the corresponding plaintexts from a given set of ciphertexts.
Although the techniques are not used together with unencrypted columns, applying these techniques to multiple columns in a table can also pose dangers. For example, most schools have a score table for exams of students in their database, and the table should be managed so that the privacy of the students is protected. A case can be imagined in which the score table contains (name, score 1, score 2, score 3,. . ., score n) as the schema and in which only the name is encrypted using a conventional encryption algorithm while the others are encrypted using an orderpreserving encryption scheme. If an adversary has prior knowledge of at least two scores about a student, he can easily guess the rank of other scores about the student as he can roughly estimate the encrypted name of the student by the order statistics.
Unlike the order-preserving encryption, related work also includes research on bucket-based indexing, hash-based indexing, and B+ tree indexing for querying encrypted data. Hacigümüs et al. proposed a bucket-based index method to query encrypted data that is based on the definition of a number of buckets on the attribute domain [6] . In order to represent the partition to which the unencrypted value belongs, an additional bucket id is created for each attribute value, and it can be indexed. Hore et al. improved this method by introducing an efficient way for partitioning the domain of attributes [7] . Nevertheless, the method yields false hits after a query, which should be removed in a postprocessing step. Moreover, it does not easily support range queries as the index domain does not necessarily preserve plaintext domain ordering.
To overcome the bucketing method, Damiani et al. proposed the B+ tree index for range queries as well as the hash-based index for equality queries [8] , [9] . The hashbased index method is similar to the bucket-based index method and is based on a one-way hash function. The drawback of the hash-based method is that it does not support range queries in the same way as the bucket-based method. The B+ tree index method utilizes the traditional B+ tree data structure used by DBMS for physically indexing data. The advantage of this approach is that it can support range queries while the content of the B+ tree is not visible to an untrusted DBMS. The drawback, however, is that a B+ tree traversal can only be performed by a trusted front-end that has to execute a sequence of queries retrieving tree nodes at progressively deeper levels.
Moreover, in an effort to target strong security goals and provide provably secure constructions, several studies have been done by cryptographers in the field of database security [10] - [14] . Most works focus on the relatively welldefined subproblem of a secure keyword search on encrypted data; these types of searches require linear search time in database size for each query, which is unacceptable.
In summary, the order-preserving encryption technique is a remarkable achievement due to its many advantages for efficient queries compared to other database encryption methods. Its only shortcomings are related to its level of security. Here, a new encryption scheme that is superior to the previous order-preserving encryption techniques with respect to efficiency and security is presented.
Preliminaries
The main idea of COPE is to transform the plaintext values twice. The first transformation serves to hide the order of the plaintexts to enhance the level of security, and the second preserves the order to improve the efficiency. In this section, a realistic threat model is assumed and the COPE algorithm is briefly reviewed.
Security Model
Before further discussion on database encryption, it is important to specify a realistic threat model clearly. As shown Fig. 1 , this model includes the following assumptions:
• The database software and its memory are trusted.
Thus, an adversary cannot see the encrypting/ decrypting process and has no access to the values in Fig. 1 Threat model. the memory of DBMS.
• The disk-resident data, such as schemata and transaction logs, is basically encrypted, but not all of the data values may be encrypted. That is, a sensitive column is encrypted while the other columns are not.
• An adversary may have limited access to a portion of the data on the database disk. Thus, attacks using both encrypted and unencrypted data can in this case be performed by the adversary.
It was shown in [4] that OPES was robust against estimation exposure under the assumptions that all the data in a database were encrypted. However, it is more efficient and practical to encrypt only sensitive data while leaving other data unencrypted as mentioned above. In these environments, an adversary can mount the 'ciphertext-only attack' further using the unencrypted column, as he can read unencrypted data as well as encrypted data. Order information is critical to the user's privacy, especially when the rank itself is sensitive. Therefore, order-preserving encryption algorithms such as OPES are not secure against attacks using order information even if the data distribution is not known to the adversary.
For example, suppose that a bank uses a customer table with schema (name, age, address, account number, deposited amount) in which only the deposited amount is sensitive. Thus, the deposited amount column is encrypted using OPES while leaving other columns unencrypted. If an adversary simply has access to the database, private information of high-ranking customers about the deposited amount can be easily obtained from the order of the encrypted data. Similarly, if he has prior information about the deposited amount of two customers, the deposited amount of any customer between them can be roughly estimated.
Moreover, if the distribution of plaintexts is known to the adversary, it is possible to guess very precisely the exact data value x corresponding to an encrypted value y. This may cause more serious problems; hence, in addition to robustness against distribution exposure, it is necessary to define a new security measure in a manner that is different from the conventional security assessment of an encryption algorithm, where it is analyzed whether the adversary can find the key used for encryption. At this point, an application environment in which the goals are secure against distribution and order exposures is considered. These two exposures are defined as the following security measures:
• Distribution Exposure (DE): DE is related to whether an adversary is able to guess the data distribution from an encrypted column. With respect to sensitive numeric data, if the distribution of plaintexts is known to an adversary, he can roughly estimate the mean, variance and even some special information of the plaintexts. This is similar to the estimation exposure defined in [4] .
• Order Exposure (OE): OE is defined as the probability of determing the correct order of the corresponding plaintexts for given r arbitrary ciphertexts. If the order of plaintexts is known to an adversary, he can easily guess the data value as well as obtain private information from the rank itself. The strength of an encryption scheme with respect to OE against the adversary is quantified as following:
where x i and y i are the plaintext and ciphertext, respectively.
Overview of COPE
This section offers a brief review of how COPE works. Figure 2 presents a graphical view of this. In Phase 1, the buckets are reordered randomly while the order of attributes within a bucket is resorted in ascending or descending order. As a result, an original value is transformed into a disordered value. As shown in Fig. 2 , the numeric domain of a shuffled value y after Phase 1 equals one of the original x values apart from the order. Phase 2 provides only an order-preserving encryption role. That is, the shuffled value y transitions from a numeric domain to a lexicographic domain by chaotic β-expansion; it is mapped into a value z in the lexicographic domain. COPE is outlined in the following two stages:
The domain of the original data is partitioned into m buckets and the m buckets are then randomly mixed. For each bucket, the ascending or descending order is also determined. Therefore, the plaintext database X is transformed into the rearranged database Y. That is, the ith plaintext value does not guarantee the ith value in the sorted values obtained after random shuffling. Here, the orders of the interbucket and the intra-bucket are determined by some information K S , which serves as the encryption key. According to Fig. 2 , the following relationship between x and y can be known: Fig. 2 The concept of COPE.
Here, y i = E s (x i ) and the E s (·) is the encryption function specified in Sect. 4.
Chaotic Beta-expansion:
This process is called the chaotic β-expansion because it resembles a chaotic change from one state to another depending on beta information K β . Thus, K β serves as the encryption key. The randomly shuffled database Y is transformed into the cipher database Z such that the values in Z are lexicographically ordered. The order between real numbers is given by the lexicographic order on the chaotic β-expansion. That is, the ith input value is encrypted into the ith word in the sorted list obtained from the chaotic β-expansion. The expression is
Clearly, this scheme does not reveal any information concering original values, including the order and distribution, as the encrypted values were shuffled and lexicographically transformed by K S and K β . Even if an adversary has all of the encrypted values and unencrypted columns corresponding to data encrypted using COPE, the adversary cannot infer both K S and K β from the information. Details of the two stages are given in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively.
Random Shuffling
The main idea of random shuffling is to hide the order of the domain of a column by rearranging the partitions of a domain on a line. This is similar to card shuffling in a card game. The domain of original data is initially partitioned into m buckets by a PRNG such that the size of the buckets is random. The order of the inter-bucket is then determined according to the sequence of random numbers generated by the PRNG. In Fig. 3 , seven random numbers are generated on the interval [0, 100], and the order for each bucket depends on the value of i, the sequence of the random number.
Next, the order within the ith bucket B i is preserved or reversed using the sign function defined as follows:
Here, size(B i ) = a 0 .a 1 The order sign for each bucket is also marked in Fig. 3 . Given that the original values are rearranged in both Fig. 3 Bucket-ordering example.
the inter-bucket and the intra-bucket, the order of the original values will be randomly hidden. The randomness of the order increases as the number of buckets increases. Thus, the original values are transformed into rearranged values by the encryption function in which the key K S includes the m + 1 bucket boundaries, the order of m buckets, and the increasing or decreasing sign within each m bucket. Here, as K S can be generated perfectly from the two parameters of the number of data values and initial value of the PRNG, it is necessary to store only the two parameters as the encryption key. From this point, this paper utilizes the notations shown in Table 1 to define the encryption and decryption algorithms.
In Table 2 , Steps 2-4 of the encryption algorithm (E S ) represent the process of assigning the value (x) of the initial bucket to a new value (x ) of a transformed bucket. Steps 5-7 are the process of assigning a new value (x ) to an encrypted value (y) according to the ordering sign of the bucket. Similarly, Table 3 (D S ) shows the reverse process of the encryption algorithm for decrypting the encrypted value (y). Table 2 Encryption algorithm E S .
Input: attribute {x} to encrypted and the secret key K S Output: encrypted attribute {y} Input: ciphertext {y} and the secret key K S Output: plaintext {x}
As a result, random shuffling cannot hide the order of the original data, but also can normalize the original distribution effectively as a large number of buckets make the original data spread out uniformly. On the other hand, the time overhead may occur due to the number of buckets. This will be shown experimentally in Sect. 6.
Chaotic Beta-Expansion
Techniques for representing numbers have been well studied in number theory [18] - [20] . Numbers are seen as finite or infinite words over an alphabet of digits. Here, the representation of a real number, called β-expansion, is explained. One of the most interesting properties of β-expansion is that it results in a lexicographic order. Thus, it can be simply used as an order-preserving encryption algorithm in which the encryption key is the parameter value β. This technique will be generalized in a more complex manner, which will enhanced the security of the algorithm. This is called the chaotic β-expansion. Unlike β-expansion, it is allowed to generate as many β values as is necessary. Consequently, it is very chaotic, which makes it impossible for the β values to be estimated.
Beta-Expansion
Representations of real numbers were introduced by Rényi [18] under the name of β-expansions and were extensively studied in ergodic theory and symbolic dynamics. The representations arise from the orbits of a piecewise monotone transformation of the unit interval and consist in taking for a base a real number β > 1. When β is actually an integer, this is the standard representation. When β is not an integer, a number may have several different β-representations. The definition of β-expansions and their properties can now be known [19] , [20] . Let the base β > 1 be a real number, and y be a real number in the interval [0, 1]. A representation in base β (or a β-representation) of y is an infinite word (w i ) i≥1 such that
The β-expansion, a particular β-representation, can be computed by the greedy algorithm: Denote by y and {y} the integer part and the fraction part of a number y. Set r 0 = y and let for i ≥ 1,
An equivalent definition is obtained using the β-transformation of the unit interval which is the mapping T β : y → βy (mod1). Proof. See [20] .
Here, d β (y) = (w i ) i≥1 expressed by an infinite word is eventually periodic if β and y are rational numbers [21] . Thus, this property makes it simple to be implemented.
Chaotic Beta-Expansion
The β-expansion is excessively simple and thus cannot be directly applied to database encryption even when it preserves the order. The theory of β-expansion is then generalized with respect to β, naturally, ensuring the preservation of the order.
Let y be any real number for a given domain [0, d] in the database and p be any real number greater than d. Let b k (apart from b n ) be a random number generated from the Fig. 4 )
The chaotic β-expansion can be computed by the following proposed algorithm: Denote by y and {y} the quotient part and the remainder part when dividing y by p. Set r 0 = y and let for i ≥ 1, The chaotic β-expansion is characterized by the following property, which is similar to the Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: Let x and y be two real numbers from [0, p]. Then x < y if and only if
Proof. See Appendix.
Here, d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p (y) is the encrypted value z of y in the database. Additionally, d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p (y) = (w 1 w 2 · · ·) expressed by an infinite word is eventually periodic if β and y are rational numbers.
Thus, this encryption preserves the lexicographic order purely, which enables fast queries on the encrypted database. The lexicographic ordered data also makes it hard for the original distribution to be estimated. Although an adversary attempts to guess the original distribution from a fixed number of digits of the encrypted data, the adversary can be forced to make large estimation errors, as it is very hard to know both the number of intervals and each interval size. Moreover, if the chaotic β-expansion is combined with random shuffling, it is nearly impossible to estimate the original distribution from values encrypted using COPE in which the m buckets and the n beta values are determined independently in the two phases. Therefore, the chaotic β-expansion can contribute to effectively hiding the original distribution as well as performing fast queries on encrypted data. This will be discussed in Sect. 6.
Encryption Key
The chaotic β-expansion of a number y can be perfectly obtained from the n beta values and the p value, and vice versa, as mentioned earlier. The n + 1 values are stored as the key K β value for encrypting the plaintext data and decrypting the lexicographic ordered data. Thus, it is impossible to estimate K β exactly as the n + 1 values can be selected infinitely. Here, K β serves as the encryption key, which can be generated instantly without any assumption of the distribution of the input data. It provides strong updates as it is not necessary to update K β no matter how many data values are replaced, causing the plaintext distribution to change. Moreover, the key can be regenerated easily anytime, which provides easy key management.
Extensions
When implementing the chaotic β-expansion, the following two extensions can be used to avoid duplicates and computational complexity. If the same encryption key is used in the chaotic β-expansion, duplicates of a given value y i are encrypted into those of an identical ciphertext z i . It is possible to avoid these duplicates of an encrypted value using a simple substitution of the value y i . That is, a given value y i can be mapped into a value randomly chosen from the interval [y i , y i+1 ). As a result, the encrypted values of y i will be spread in the interval [z i , z i+1 ). Query predicates for selecting data encrypted using this extension can simply be transformed by converting equality into a range predicate.
The chaotic β-expansion is a kind of symmetric key based encryption algorithm. Thus, it should be precisely decrypted by the key. An infinite word can be considered as a conventional fixed-radix in computer arithmetic [22] when it is implemented. However, when the infinite word is decrypted, round-off errors may occur due to the computational complexity unless it is not computed carefully. With COPE, most numbers can be distinguishable clearly from each other with a fixed number of digits of the infinite word for any of the datasets. In order to avoid decryption loss, this can also be used in the manner of a hash function by selecting only a fixed number of digits from d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p (y). Hence, this can be easily used but should require an additional value encrypted by a standard encryption algorithm. That is, the finite word encrypted with COPE is used for a fast search that utilizes an index, and the value encrypted with the standard encryption algorithm is used for an exact decryption. However, this should be used selectively considering the given circumstances as it leads to additional space overhead.
Evaluation
The COPE algorithm is analyzed in terms of two aspects: efficiency and security. It is then compared mainly with the OPES algorithm.
Efficiency Analysis
For the efficiency analysis, the four main points (range query, insertion time, updatability and join query) are investigated so that they are well considered when applying an encryption algorithm to the existing database system. The COPE algorithm was initially implemented in C++ over Oracle 9i, and the execution times of range query and insertion of a record were measured. The experiments were conducted using Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES release 3 on an IBM server with a 3 GHz Intel Xeon processor and 4 GB of memory. Figure 5 shows the running times of the range query for the eighteen datasets with dataset sizes ranging from 10 thousand to 1 million records. The datasets consist of integers selected randomly from a uniform distribution with an interval [0, 10 8 ]. The running time for a different number of buckets when the range for the query was 5 × 10 6 was then compared. The running time includes only the transaction time (apart from the decryption time), as it generally increases as the range of the query increases. The datasets encrypted using COPE and OPES used B+ tree indexes. The target distribution in OPES was a gaussian distribution. Three datasets of plaintext were not indexed. Thus, the time overhead was relatively observed. The efficiency of COPE without random shuffling (m = 1), which is a pure order-preserving function, is approximately equal to that of OPES because the two algorithms purely preserve order. The query execution time for COPE including ran- dom shuffling, which partially preserves the order, increases by a certain degree with an increase in the number of buckets in the random shuffling phase. Nevertheless, it shows excellent performance compared to the plaintext without an index. The increase in the number of buckets has a negative effect on the range query but a positive effect on the security, which will be discussed later in this paper. Figure 6 shows the average times for inserting an additional record in a table with 1 million records. The running time includes the encryption time. In COPE, the time overhead caused by the number of buckets is negligibly small. It also shows little difference when compared with OPES and the plaintext.
In order to use an encryption algorithm practically in DBMS, the algorithm should be able to support updates well. Even if sufficient data to change the initial plaintext distribution are newly inserted or deleted, the values already encrypted with COPE do not have to be re-encrypted as long as the encryption key does not change. COPE can also encrypt new data from the beginning without any distribution as it does not make use of the data distribution. On the other hand, because OPES assumes that there already exists a distribution from the beginning and that the distribution does not change, it can be said that only weak updates under a limited distribution condition are permitted.
A join query is one of the most commonly used op- erations in applications to the point that many studies of database systems have aimed at efficient implementation of the operation. Basically, it requires that an attribute matched in each column of the joined tables should remain identical after encryption. In COPE, any join operation, such as an inner join and an outer join operation, can be directly performed if only the encryption key is synchronously managed for each column of the joined tables, whereas for a join query with OPES, the distribution of each column of the joined tables should be identical, which unfortunately does not occur in most cases. In Table 4 , the efficiency of COPE and OPES are compared for each SQL operation.
Security Analysis
In Sect. 3, the two security measures were defined under a real threat model. Here, the security of COPE against the distribution exposure (DE) and the order exposure (OE) is discussed.
As described in the previous two sections, the encryption function of COPE, E COPE , consists of the random shuffling function, E S , and the chaotic β-expansion function, d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p . It can be expressed as E COPE 
. An adversary can guess the number of b k (n) from the first digit w 1 of z, as the z values with the same w 1 can be regarded as being within a same interval. However, the adversary cannot know the boundary of each n interval. Moreover, the number of buckets (m) in the random shuffling phase is different from the number of b k (n) in the chaotic β-expansion phase, and the buckets are mixed randomly. Particularly, if m is larger than n, the encrypted data z corresponding to the original data x will be spread out uniformly in terms of equiwidth in the lexicographic domain regardless of the original data distribution. Figure 7 shows the distributions of the encrypted values obtained using this scheme and OPES for 1,000 data values sampled from the two different distributions of Uniform and Gaussian with an interval [0, 10 6 ]. The target distributions of OPES were Gaussian and Uniform, respectively. The two samples were encrypted using COPE with m = 500 and n = 20. Here, each interval size of x and y was determined at the equi-width. In this case, both the input and encrypted distributions were scaled to be between 0 and 1. It was found that the result of running COPE with different input distributions appears identical and uniformly dispersed. These two encrypted distributions using COPE were verified to be consistent with the uniform distribution at a significance level of 5% by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [23] . As a result, it is impossible to guess the distribution of x from z obtained from the encryption of COPE. OPES was also consistent with each target distribution by the test. Hence, the proposed scheme is shown to be secure against DE. Figure 8 shows the distributions of encrypted values produced by COPE without random shuffling (m = 1). Here, each interval size of the chaotic β-expansion was not determined at the equi-width; it was instead determined such that b k−1 was a multiple of the kth interval width (b k − b k−1 ) under the condition β k−1 ≤ β k . Then, the y values within the kth interval are encrypted into the same value w 1 . However, as shown in Fig. 8 , it makes large estimation errors to guess the input distribution from the first digit w 1 of z, as the adversary cannot exactly know the size of each n interval. The distribution of encrypted values looks identical even if the input distributions are very different.
Moreover, if b k−1 is not a multiple of the kth interval width under the condition β k−1 ≤ β k , the y values within the kth interval are not necessarily transformed into the same value w 1 . That is, the y values can be mapped into one of the two w 1 values. In this case, as the adversary cannot exactly know the number of intervals as well as each interval size, it is meaningless to guess the input distribution from the first digits of the encrypted values. Therefore, the chaotic β-expansion itself can be used to effectively hide the original data distribution by dividing the interval [0, p) into irregular sizes.
Next, the security of the proposed scheme against OE is analyzed. In previous order-preserving encryption methods, for given r arbitrary ciphertexts, the order of the corresponding plaintexts is identical to the order of the ciphertexts. Hence, the order exposure of the methods is always 1. At this point, it is necessary to estimate the order exposure of COPE. In COPE, as mentioned earlier, the buckets are mixed in the random shuffling phase so that the order is hidden. The probability that for a given three arbitrary ciphertexts the order of the corresponding plaintexts is identical to the order of the ciphertexts is then calculated. The following events are defined:
• A = {All of the three ciphertexts are selected in a bucket among m buckets.} • B = {One ciphertext and two ciphertexts are selected in different buckets among m buckets.} • C = {Each of the three ciphertexts is selected in different buckets among m buckets.} This problem can then be modeled by placing r ciphertexts into m buckets in conbinatorics [24] . Table 5 indicates the order exposure of COPE when r = 3, in which the probability (
) is presented as a function of the number of buckets. Similarly, the probability when r = 2 ( ) can also be calculated. Figure 9 shows that the order exposure of COPE significantly decreases with the increase in the value of r. Moreover, it decreases with the increase in the value of the buckets. Thus, although an adversary may succeed in obtaining r ciphertexts, the adversary may not confirm the correct order of the corresponding plaintexts. Hence, the proposed scheme is shown to also be very robust against OE.
In summary, it can be said that an increase in the number of buckets in the random shuffling phase contributes to enhancing security against DE as well as OE, whereas it may increase processing time. As shown in Fig. 9 , the or- Table 5 Calculating the order exposure when r = 3. der exposure converges to the same value as the number of buckets increases. Thus, it is desirable to first determine the minimum m buckets satisfying a tolerable degree of OE in the random shuffling phase for maximizing the performance of the database system and then to choose the n beta values in the chaotic β-expansion phase. The robustness against DE can be enhanced sufficiently by the chaotic β-expansion even when the original distribution cannot be perfectly hidden after the random shuffling phase. In this way, the COPE algorithm can be reasonably applied to real systems, as both the efficiency and the security can be achieved by selectively adjusting the m buckets and the n beta values.
Conclusion
Database encryption is an emerging technology that can be used to protect the data held by many organizations. This paper focused on both security problems under a real threat model and efficiency issues related to query executions over encrypted databases. Previous order-preserving encryption technologies have been developed while considering only the 'ciphertext-only attack'. Hence, they may not be secure against many attack scenarios under the threat model considered in this paper. It is also not desirable to perform updates that cause some changes in the initial distribution, as well as operations such as a join query, which are executed in multiple columns of databases.
A new encryption scheme, called COPE, is proposed in this paper. It allows efficient and secure queries to be directly applied to encrypted data. For efficient queries, it is possible to perform SQL operations such as join queries very efficiently. Moreover, fast searches are possible while COPE maintains the order of the plaintext partially without any assumption of the initial distribution. In this way, it is more efficient than previous order-preserving encryptions. For enhancing security, the order of the plaintexts is ordinarily hidden; however it can be identified by the database system.
There are other issues that need to be investigated further. In the future, we intend to assess privacy loss and improve this scheme in the case when an adversary succeeds in obtaining more information regarding the encrypted data, which is considered to be a more realistic scenario. We also plan to study the encryption of non-numeric data in which indexes should be sorted lexicographically.
The Proof of Theorem 2:
Let d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p (x) = (x i ) i≥1 and d β 1 β 2 ···β n ,p (y) = (y i ) i≥1 . Suppose that (x i ) i≥1 < (y i ) i≥1 . There exists k ≥ 1 such that x k < y k and x 1 · · · x k−1 = y 1 · · · y k−1 . Hence,
By (A.1),
Thus,
Finally,
